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Technological Controversy and US Ballistic Missile Defence: Star Warriors versus 
the Huntsville Mafiai 
 
 
Abstract 
Controversy over the technical feasibility of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) has 
typically been seen as correlated to judgments of that technology’s desirability. 
Opponents of BMD tend to question its feasibility whereas supporters argue that it is 
technically possible, at least to a degree adequate to enhance national security. 
However, this categorization is a simplification; two camps of BMD supporters have 
emerged over the years, with distinctly different views as to which technology they 
believe to offer the greatest effectiveness. This paper describes the emergence of 
these two camps – one preferring ground-based interceptors, the other space-based 
systems – and argues that the lack of operational experience means that complete 
closure around one approach is unlikely. 
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Introduction 
Much of the debate over US ballistic missile defence (BMD) has been characterized 
as a battle between proponents and opponents over both the desirability and 
feasibility of BMD. The arguments for and against BMD have been articulated many 
times since they were first made in the 1960s, and the rhetoric of these positions has 
become entrenched.ii However, viewing the debate over the feasibility of BMD as 
either for or against is a misleading simplification. In fact, supporters of BMD are 
themselves divided by a dispute over the best technical means to achieve an 
effective defence, with one side preferring ground (or sea) based defences and the 
other advocating defensive systems based in space.iii 
This paper describes the history of US BMD technology as it relates to the 
development of these two technological approaches, and examines why such 
divergent views have persisted. What is distinctive about the debate over BMD is 
that it is not simply a matter of disagreement about the desirability of the 
technology. There is dispute about this, including opposition that stems from 
concerns about potential arms race escalation,iv but a substantial part of the 
controversy over BMD hinges on questions of feasibility. What is particularly 
distinctive about BMD is the way that these doubts about technical feasibility have 
persisted over a period lasting more than half a century. 
One view of the persistence of skepticism regarding the feasibility of BMD would be 
to say, as many opponents do, that it is simply too hard a technical challenge, 
especially in the face of a determined enemy. In this view, any technological 
advances that help the defence are equally likely to provide counter-measures to 
help overcome that defence, and the immensely destructive nature of nuclear 
weapons means that even a small percentage of ‘leakage’ would make a defence 
worthless.v 
However, the idea that missile defences need to be one hundred percent perfect is a 
construct of a particular period of time, not a requirement that has been constant 
throughout the whole history. At certain periods the stated goal has been population 
or area defence, but at others it has been the defence of missile silos or other key 
assets (known as point defence). What counts as an effective defence has varied over 
time and has never been a subject of complete agreement.vi  
Ballistic missile defence technology thus has always involved high levels of 
‘interpretative flexibility’, both with regard to its objectives, as well as the means of 
achieving those objectives.vii Although advocates of BMD believe it is possible to 
attain an adequate technical performance, they do not agree on the best 
technological means to achieve this. At the heart of the dispute is the difficulty of 
obtaining convincing empirical evidence about the performance of BMD technology. 
There has (thankfully) been no operational experience of the use of BMD against a 
nuclear attack, nor indeed any experience of a nuclear conflict. Empirical evidence of 
the feasibility of intercontinental BMD technology thus relies entirely on testing, but 
this is unavoidably limited in scope.viii As Phil Coyle, then Director, Operational Test 
and Evaluation at the Pentagon, said in 2000, ‘it is impractical to conduct fully 
operationally realistic intercept flight testing across the wide spectrum of possible 
scenarios.’ix Full-scale flight-testing is extremely expensive (current tests cost around 
$100 million a shot), geographically limited by range safety concerns, and inevitably 
prone to criticisms that it is insufficiently similar to operational usage.x 
Lacking compelling empirical evidence from use or testing, knowledge about the 
performance of BMD technology has instead been strongly shaped by theoretical 
debates about the in-principle benefits of one approach versus another, and by the 
ability of the various protagonists to adapt to or shape the prevailing political 
currents. Thus, although technical disputes are at the centre of this history, BMD has 
been, and remains, the most political of technologies. 
The history of US missile defence can be viewed as three main phases. The first, 
culminating in the deployment of the Safeguard system in 1975, involved ground-
based missiles and radars, in which the radars were designed to guide a defensive 
interceptor armed with a nuclear warhead sufficiently close to the enemy warhead. 
The second phase, from 1983 to 1991, saw space-based systems given preference, 
although no system was actually deployed. Finally, the third phase, from 1991 to the 
present, has seen ground-based interceptors return to favour, though no longer with 
the use of nuclear warheads. Instead, the current system uses hit-to-kill technology 
in which the interceptor kill vehicle is designed to collide physically with incoming 
warheads. 
Phase 1: The Path to Safeguard 
Although interest in defence against ballistic missiles arose as soon as the first such 
missile, the German V2, went into operation towards the end of World War II, 
serious system development did not get underway in the US until the mid-1950s. 
Intelligence reports in June 1955 suggested that the Soviet Union would soon have 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) able to threaten the USA and the recently-
started NIKE II study on air defence, switched its emphasis from anti-aircraft 
defence to anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence.xi 
Thereafter, during the late 1950s and 1960s ABM technology was developed with a 
common technical approach within a stable organizational setting. The 
organizational setting was established in 1958 when the Army, with its missile 
defence operations in Huntsville, Alabama, was given sole responsibility for ABM 
development, despite the protestations of the Air Force.xii The first ABM system 
developed was the Nike Zeus three-stage missile armed with a nuclear warhead and 
with associated radar and control systems to direct the missile towards the target 
reentry vehicle. From 1960 onwards the Army pressed for a deployment decision 
with no success, despite enrolling support in Congress ‘to loose the Zeus’.xiii  
While the Army was focused on building an operational system, the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was set up in 1958 to conduct research into 
advanced technologies including missile defence. ARPA initiated Project Defender 
‘to obtain an advanced system of defense, either supplementary to or extending 
beyond the present Nike-Zeus terminal intercept concept.’xiv Both ARPA and the Air 
Force carried out work on a range of approaches, including futuristic technologies 
such as lasers and particle beams.xv Many of the approaches investigated in Project 
Defender, including a space-based interceptor (ballistic missile boost intercepts or 
BAMBI) designed to attack Soviet missiles in their initial boost phase, would be 
revived later in the 1980s.xvi ARPA also supported research at the Lincoln 
Laboratory at MIT, which to this day continues to be at the forefront of 
developments in discrimination techniques.xvii This twin track approach established 
the geography of missile defence for many years to come: ‘Most of the people in 
Washington came out of ARPA and most of the people in Huntsville came out of the 
Army Missile Command.’xviii 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara declined to go ahead with Zeus deployment, 
and in 1963 instead instigated the Nike X programme which comprised a ‘number of 
studies and exploratory developments aimed at leading from the … outmoded 
NIKE-ZEUS to the next generation ABM system’.xix Although conceding that Nike 
Zeus deployment might have some benefits – possibly reducing US casualtiesxx in 
the event of a nuclear war and complicating Soviet planning – he concluded that 
deployment would be premature given the limitations of the technology.xxi 
Nike X involved two major advances over Zeus. First, Nike X comprised a layered 
defence, with a further development of the Zeus missile (later known as Spartan) as 
the first line of defence, able to intercept warheads up to an altitude of about 100 
miles. A second line of defence was provided by the high acceleration Sprint missile 
that was designed to intercept reentry vehicles within the atmosphere, at an altitude 
of between 20 and 30 miles, by which time any decoys or other lightweight 
penetration aids would have been stripped away by drag. The second significant 
advance of Nike X was the use of phased array radars developed in ARPA’s Project 
Defender. Because they scanned electronically rather than mechanically, these radars 
were less fragile, and could handle many more targets, more rapidly.xxii 
Despite these improvements, further efforts by the Army to get an ABM deployment 
approved in 1965 were rejected for two reasons. First, McNamara was concerned 
that this would be technologically premature and that early deployment would 
result in wasteful obsolescence. Second, comparisons of the effects of various 
combinations of offence and defence on American casualties in a nuclear exchange 
suggested that investment in defences would not be cost effective.xxiii Better value, in 
terms of American lives saved per dollar, could be achieved by enhancing the ability 
of US offensive weapons to penetrate Soviet defences.xxiv 
McNamara continued to oppose ABM deployment, but in 1967 he was over-ruled by 
President Johnson who was no longer prepared to leave defence matters to 
McNamara’s discretion. Disillusioned with the state of the war in Vietnam and 
attuned to the demands of domestic politics (and fearful of an ‘ABM gap’ being used 
against him in the 1968 presidential campaign), Johnson pushed McNamara to 
compromise.xxv The arguments of ABM supporters were also enhanced by the 
detonation of China’s first H-bomb in June 1967, and by McNamara’s failure to 
convince the Soviet Premier Kosygin that defensive systems should be limited to 
prevent an arms race.xxvi  
The result was McNamara’s famous San Francisco speech of September 1967. 
Chinese developments provided a rationale for McNamara to give some ground on 
ABM deployment – a limited system aimed at the potential Chinese threat – while 
resisting the major deployment geared towards the Soviet threat which he believed 
to be not only futile but also counterproductive. His speech commenced by pointing 
out that US and Soviet nuclear forces were so extensive that neither could deny the 
other the power to retaliate even if they did deploy an ABM. Instead, he argued, it 
would be more logical to engage in arms control negotiations to limit both ‘offensive 
and defensive strategic nuclear forces’.xxvii Following this logic, he dismissed the 
Soviet deployment of an ABM system as not posing a threat to the ability of the US 
to achieve ‘assured destruction’ against the Soviet Union, and rejected deployment 
of a US ABM system aimed at defending against a Soviet attack on the grounds that 
it would not work. 
Instead, McNamara announced an ABM system geared towards the Chinese, a 
threat that for the foreseeable future would comprise only a small number of 
unsophisticated ICBMs. Against this even a ‘thin’ ABM system might be effective, 
but such a system would not pose a significant threat to the much larger and more 
capable Soviet nuclear forces. Moreover, McNamara noted, in addition to defending 
against the Chinese this thin ABM could have secondary benefits. First, it could be 
used to defend US Minuteman missile fields, thus adding to the ability of the US to 
guarantee assured destruction retaliation. Second, it could provide protection 
against any accidental launches of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. What it was not, 
McNamara emphasised, was a first step in a wider deployment aimed at the Soviet 
Union. On 4 November he announced that the anti-Chinese ABM would be named 
Sentinel, with the Nike-X designation retained for continuing R&D on BMD 
technology. Later, McNamara would admit that the announcement of Sentinel was 
purely due to ‘the political pressure, and the fact that the Congress had authorized 
such a system, appropriated funds for it, and was pushing unmercifully to deploy 
not the thin system but a thick system’.xxviii 
Of the fifteen areas chosen for Sentinel defence, ten were major urban centres, one 
was Alaska, and the other four were air force bases that housed US retaliatory forces. 
However, the location of many of these bases stoked opposition to ABM technology 
as local protesters opposed the proximity of Sentinel to cities. Critics such as the 
Federation of American Scientists argued that Sentinel bases would be targets, 
drawing down fire on nearby cities, making them ‘megaton magnets’, and there was 
also concern that the nuclear warheads on ABM interceptors might explode 
accidentally or, in the case of launch, prematurely.xxix 
Ironically, after years of pushing the administration to deploy an ABM system, 
Congress now saw the emergence of a coordinated opposition. Along with concern 
over the location of Sentinel sites, there was a pent up dissatisfaction with US 
defence decision-making with power having being increasingly centralized by 
McNamara in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with Congress having being 
dominated by traditionally conservative committees that were typically 
unquestioning of the claims of the military, and with the Vietnam war going so 
badly.xxx 
 
Given this upsurge of opposition, it was not surprising that the new Nixon 
administration initiated a review of US strategic programmes on 20 January 1969, 
shortly after taking office. On 6 February 1969, the new Secretary of Defense, Melvin 
Laird, halted Sentinel, pending completion of this review.xxxi The decision was made 
to change the focus of Sentinel to protect US ICBM fields rather than cities, with 
population defence against accidental launches, China, and even the Soviet Union 
suggested as future potential developments.xxxii 
 
Renamed as Safeguard, this system was to encompass up to twelve sites, with initial 
construction of two at Malmstrom, Montana and Grand Forks, North Dakota to 
protect Minuteman ICBM fields. Safeguard reduced the local opposition provoked 
by Sentinel by moving the ABM interceptors away from cities, but the basic 
technology of Safeguard – Spartan and Sprint interceptors controlled by large 
ground-based radars – remained the same: 
 
… the mission change from city defense to silo defense (Sentinel to 
Safeguard) was made without changing the system design in the 
slightest. Granted that this carryover of the same system design was an 
expedient in a difficult political environment, it was a mistake in a 
technical sense. Safeguard was too large, soft and expensive to use as a 
defense of the Minuteman forces.xxxiii 
Ironically, although Safeguard procurement was largely successful with the system 
completed more or less on time and budget, this particular BMD technology would 
be very short-lived.  Only one site was built, comprising radars, and both Spartan 
and Sprint missiles, to protect a Minuteman ICBM field at Grand Forks, North 
Dakota. However, the Army and DoD had serious misgivings about its effectiveness, 
as did Bell Labs, the prime contractor building the system. Indeed, the President had 
been informed as early as April 1970 about Bells’ ‘belief that the system, as it is being 
built, cannot adequately perform the missions assigned to it.’xxxiv Not only was it 
considered unlikely to be very effective against ICBMs carrying multiple warheads 
(MIRVs), but also there were doubts about whether the detonation of Safeguard’s 
own nuclear warheads would blind the defensive radars and/or prevent the launch 
of the ICBMs that were being defended. Moreover, ‘Spartan, which was the area 
interceptor, with over a megaton of nuclear warhead, could be defeated by chaff.’xxxv 
 
Congress had only initially approved Safeguard by the most marginal of votes, and 
the revelation that the DoD itself had little faith in its effectiveness and planned to 
deactivate the system within a couple of years, led to its swift demise.xxxvi On 2 
October 1975, just after the system had been declared operational, the House voted 
to deactivate Safeguard.xxxvii Starting in February 1976 the Army began removing the 
missiles and warheads from their silos and turned off the missile site radar.xxxviii 
 
Doubts about the effectiveness of ABM systems had also by this time played a part 
in the negotiation of the ABM Treaty limiting the deployment of such systems by the 
USA and Soviet Union. Implicit in this treaty was the recognition that offensive 
nuclear forces would always have the upper hand, and that deployment of ABM 
defences would only serve to add another, unproductive, arena of competition to the 
arms race. The superpowers thus agreed, in effect, that ‘mutual assured destruction’ 
was an unavoidable fact of life to which there was no convincing technological 
alternative, and that it was thus better to enshrine this reality in an agreement 
limiting the development and deployment of BMD technology.xxxix 
 
Following the demise of Safeguard, work at Huntsville focused on improving 
concepts for the protection of missile silos and on basic R&D.xl The change in 
approach was summed up by the Army’s Ballistic Missile Defense programme 
manager, Major General Robert C. Marshall: 
 
For the past 20 years the major activities of the BMD community have, 
for the most part, been directed toward the achievement of one 
primary goal – the development and deployment of a BMD system. … 
Today our situation is quite different. We do not have a specific system 
deployment objective as a follow-on to SAFEGUARD. Instead our 
emphasis now is on R&D as a hedge against the uncertainties of the 
future.xli 
 
Although no deployment decision was taken, consideration was given to using a 
Site Defense system to enhance the survivability of the MX ICBM. The Army also 
continued to support work on directed energy weapons such as lasers and particle 
beams.xlii Indeed the second half of the 1970s saw an upsurge in interest in such 
technologies, with increasing lobbying for BMD based on more exotic 
technologies.xliii However, the most significant development at Huntsville stemmed 
from its work on infra-red homing guidance technology. It was recognized that 
infra-red detecting semiconductors had great potential for ‘seeing’ objects against 
the cold background of space.xliv Initially, studies into the potential of this 
technology as an alternative to the radar-based command guidance approach, as 
used in Safeguard, were still predicated on the use of nuclear warheads, but with the 
hope that more accuracy would allow smaller warheads to be used. 
However, by the early 1970s work done by Lockheed in a key study known as 
LORAH (long range area homing) convinced the Army that infra-red guidance 
could enable the interceptor to actually hit the target reentry vehicle, not just get 
close to it.xlv The Army sought authorisation from Secretary of the Army John Walsh 
for a ‘hit-to-kill’ flight test programme – the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE). 
Walsh’s initial reaction was skeptical. Given that Safeguard had required the use of 
nuclear warheads with a lethal radius of about a mile, it seemed implausible that the 
Army now claimed to be able to achieve a direct hit: ‘it was kind of a hard sell 
because it’s counter-intuitive. We were using big nuclear warheads. All of a sudden 
we don’t have to use any warhead.’xlvi 
Walsh did eventually authorize HOE, and after three flight test misses, the fourth 
and final test was a complete success.xlvii However, by then – the fourth test was on 
10 June 1984 – the political climate for missile defence had changed even more 
drastically than the technology. Ironically, what at first seemed like a huge boost for 
missile defence supporters would be a set-back both for Huntsville and its hit-to-kill 
technology. By the time of the HOE flight tests the direction of US BMD efforts had 
changed completely and Huntsville would no longer be the leader of these efforts. 
After about a quarter century at the centre of US missile defence technology (albeit 
with ARPA also playing a major role until 1968), the ‘Huntsville mafia’ were about 
to find themselves marginalised.  
Phase 2: The ‘Star Wars’ Speech and the Strategic Defense Initiative 
The origins of President Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ speech of March 23, 1983 are well-
documented.xlviii The resulting Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) constituted a radical 
shift in US BMD efforts in three main ways: conceptually, technologically, and 
organizationally. Conceptually, Reagan’s speech suggested a revolution in nuclear 
strategy by aiming to make nuclear weapons ‘impotent and obsolete’. The 
President’s emphasis on protecting people from nuclear attack seemed to require an 
impervious shield over the USA. To achieve this, the rhetoric of SDI emphasized 
space-basing and the advantages inherent in boost-phase interception. Not only did 
this add a third layer to the mid-course and terminal defences envisaged in 
Safeguard - thus, on paper at least, promising lower leakagexlix - but also it had the 
benefit of intercepting missiles before their multiple warheads and decoys could be 
released. The idea of boost phase interception was not, of course, new; it had been 
studied in the earlier BAMBI concept. What was new was that SDI put boost phase 
interception at the heart of its claims to effectiveness, although the technology to 
achieve this was as yet unspecified. 
Technologically, SDI initially stressed the promise of directed-energy technologies 
such as lasers and particle beams. However, there were disputes about which 
technologies should be emphasized, even within the ranks of the ‘Star Warriors’. 
Edward Teller, along with Lowell Wood of Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, strongly pushed Livermore’s new X-ray laser concept. For example, 
Teller claimed that ‘a single X-ray laser module the size of an executive desk which 
applied this technology could potentially shoot down the entire Soviet land-based 
missile force.’l 
Others in the High Frontier group that had lobbied Reagan to support missile 
defence were skeptical about the claims made for the X-ray laser. Using a device 
based on a nuclear warhead did not gel with Reagan’s aim of making nuclear 
weapons ‘impotent and obsolete’. Early criticism of the political problems with 
basing nuclear weapons in space led Teller and Wood to devise another basing 
mode in which the X-ray laser would be deployed in submarines and ‘popped up’ 
into space on a missile when required.li 
However, most of the ‘Star Warriors’ supported boost phase interception with 
systems based permanently in space. A key figure in High Frontier (he later adopted 
the name for his own organization) was retired Army General Daniel Graham who 
favoured a return to the BAMBI concept, arguing that technological advances now 
made it feasible. Graham resuscitated the concept, renaming it Global Ballistic 
Missile Defense (GBMD).lii Others preferred a more ‘high tech’ approach, with laser 
battle stations in space being the most popular. 
Finally, SDI marked a significant shift in the way US BMD work was organized. 
Nowhere was there more surprise at Reagan’s speech than among the missile 
defence experts in Huntsville, but the Army and its contractors quickly became 
disillusioned with SDI: ‘Yeh, it screwed things up terribly. We at first thought it was 
a great thing that they set up an agency at that level to do national missile defence 
but … [they] had no interest in real solutions. They were interested in “new” 
innovative ideas - space based defence and lasers and a bunch of other utterly 
ridiculous concepts that defied the laws of physics, logic and affordability.’liii 
SDI shifted the centre of power of BMD work to Washington, DC, and increased the 
influence of the nuclear weapons laboratories at Los Alamos and Livermore. Indeed 
SDI was set up to bring new thinking to the challenge of missile defence, and to 
shake up what some saw as the entrenched ground-based approach of Huntsville. 
Secretary of Defense Weinberger decided that ‘the best way to ensure the application 
of every available resource, as quickly as possible, to the development of this new 
initiative of the President, was to create a new unit within the Department, assign to 
it full responsibility for the research and development of the project and reallocate to 
it all the resource funding that was available then for defensive work.’liv 
Boost phase interception does in theory offer great benefits in eliminating the effects 
of MIRVing. However, locating defensive weapons close enough to Soviet ICBM 
fields was problematic. The earth’s curvature meant that the early stage of a missile 
launch – the boost phase – would be out of the ‘line-of-sight’ of any surface based 
weapon. Guaranteed boost phase interception of Soviet ICBMs thus seemed to 
require space-basing, but even if the technology was available to achieve 
interception from space, there remained practical concerns.  
The logistics of putting sufficient defensive systems into orbit was (and still is) 
daunting. There is only one orbit, known as the geostationary orbit, where satellites 
move at the same speed as the earth rotates, and so stay above the same location. 
However, the geostationary orbit is 35800 kilometers above the equator and thus too 
far from boost phase targets for any realistic weapon to be effective.lv  Satellites in 
orbits closer to the earth move across the face of the earth, and so maintaining a 
capability above a particular area, such as Soviet ICBM fields, would require a large 
number of satellites. In the early 1980s it was possible to be optimistic that the Space 
Shuttle might provide cheap transportation into orbit, but such optimism proved 
unfounded.lvi Thus, apart from the availability or not of suitable weapons 
technologies, the cost of putting a constellation of battle stations into orbit led many 
to doubt the feasibility of the space-based approach. A further concern was that 
battle stations based in space would themselves be vulnerable to attack. 
Criticism of SDI intensified in 1984 with the publication of two detailed analyses by 
the Senate’s Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and the Union of Concerned 
Scientists (UCS). While the UCS  - known amongst some missile defence insiders as 
the ‘Union of Confused Scientists’ - could be dismissed as known critics of missile 
defence, the OTA report carried more weight when it was published in April 1984. 
The OTA report concluded that current and foreseeable technologies were 
inadequate to meet the defensive goals of SDI, and that the prospect of a perfect or 
near-perfect defence was ‘so remote that it should not serve as the basis of public 
expectations of national policy on ballistic missile defense.’lvii 
In fact, most administration officials were careful not to make claims about near-
perfect population defence or to endorse unambiguously the President’s aim to 
make nuclear weapons ‘impotent and obsolete’.lviii Nevertheless, the idea stuck in 
the public consciousness and would haunt future BMD development; thereafter it 
would always be judged against this demanding yardstick. At the time SDIO 
adopted a different tactic to defuse this issue. Whatever the merits of specific 
technical criticisms, SDIO took a philosophical approach that denied such defeatism. 
Thus the first Director of SDI, General Abrahamson said: ‘I don’t think anything in 
this country is technically impossible. We have a nation which indeed can produce 
miracles.’lix  
Thus continued what one Huntsville old-timer called the ‘psychedelic decade’.lx 
Many in Huntsville, as elsewhere, doubted the technical and practical 
underpinnings of ‘Star Wars’, and resented the relative neglect of their favoured 
ground-based interceptor approach: ‘of course to us since we were ground people, 
naturally we would think they’re biased towards space because we thought we 
should get more money than we got.’lxi In fact, BMD policy remained vague and 
contested within the administration.lxii While the President appeared convinced of 
the possibility of building a near-perfect defence for the whole of the USA, many of 
his administration stated more modest goals. Even the influential Fletcher report on 
technological feasibility appeared to have divided views. While its unclassified 
executive summary was optimistic – ‘The scientific community may indeed give the 
United States the means of rendering the ballistic missile threat impotent and 
obsolete’ – the main body of the report was much more pessimistic.lxiii James 
Fletcher himself, moreover, did not appear to endorse the optimistic tone of the 
executive summary, saying that: ‘There is no such thing a nuclear umbrella’.lxiv 
Nevertheless, the public perception, no doubt intentional, that SDI was aimed at 
protecting the American people from nuclear attack played well politically. The 
arguments of the Nuclear Freeze movement were undercut and the Reagan 
administration was able to soften its earlier war-mongering image. SDI 
demonstrated the administration’s commitment to defence and gave the opposition 
the difficult task of supporting vulnerability to nuclear attack. As Reagan’s National 
Security Advisor Robert McFarlane wrote to the President in late December 1984, 
‘you have thrown the left into an absolute tizzy. They are left in the position of 
advocating the most bloodthirsty strategy – Mutual Assured Destruction – as a 
means to keep the peace.’lxv 
However, beyond the politics and rhetorical ambiguity of SDI there were real 
impacts on US BMD development, prompting concerns in the Pentagon that 
deployment might be rushed before it was militarily desirable or technologically 
feasible. Three criteria were proposed to guide a deployment decision: that a BMD 
system should be militarily effective; that it should be survivable; and that it should 
be cost-effective at the margins (that is, it should not be cheaper for the enemy to 
add extra forces to overcome the defence than the additional defences necessary to 
counter those extra forces). Paul Nitze pushed these three criteria within the 
administration, which thereafter became known as the ‘Nitze criteria’, with the 
result that they became enshrined in law on May 30, 1985 as National Security 
Directive No. 172. 
These criteria were very demanding and seemed to eliminate the possibility of 
deployment of a BMD system, leaving SDI as an R&D programme, albeit one with 
high levels of funding. Although Congress did not agree to the full amount of 
funding requested for SDI, the amounts approved still meant that BMD research 
funding tripled within three years.lxvi However, because SDI was technology-driven 
across a wide range of potential approaches, there was little immediate focus on 
development of systems. Instead, individual technological breakthroughs received 
much of the emphasis, particularly if they were amenable to impressive 
demonstrations.lxvii However, the optimism that was the official line of the 
administration and high level SDI managers was not shared by most of the scientists 
and engineers working on the programme, as was discovered when Congressional 
staffers carried out interviews during 1985 at various defence laboratories. Their 
report, published in March 1986, described how most SDI scientists saw little 
progress towards a significant breakthrough in BMD technologies.lxviii Quite the 
contrary was true of one technology – the X-ray laser. Despite the claims of Teller 
and Wood, the more tests carried out on the X-ray laser, the less impressive its 
performance appeared, as earlier positive results were reinterpreted as having been 
caused by the instrumentation rather than the laser itself.lxix 
However, one category of BMD technology did have the unusual property, 
compared to most of SDI’s futuristic weapons, of actually existing and having been 
tested successfully. Hit-to-kill technology, in which an interceptor destroys an 
enemy warhead through collision, was demonstrated in the HOE test of June 1984. 
Although Secretary of Defense Weinberger noted the significance of the HOE 
intercept by saying ‘it will stand as one of the cornerstones upon which the 
president’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) will be built’, this did not turn out to be 
the case.lxx Indeed, his memoirs note ‘the strong desire we had not to let the 
programme sink back into a familiar mode of solely ground-based, largely 
ineffective, defensive systems’.lxxi 
Following the success of the final HOE test, Huntsville sought a follow-on project to 
develop the infra-red homing concept into a weaponised system. In November 1985 
Lockheed was awarded a contract to develop and test the ERIS (Exo-atmospheric 
Reentry vehicle Interceptor Subsystem) interceptor.lxxii This would eventually lead to 
two flight tests in 1991 and 1992, with the first a success and the second a failure.lxxiii 
However, despite the apparent promise of hit-to-kill technology, ground-based 
systems did not fit the boost phase intercept concept that had given Star Wars its 
theoretical plausibility. A hit-to-kill interceptor such as ERIS could achieve an 
effective midcourse interception against one enemy warhead, but the Soviet Union 
had many thousands of warheads. Moreover, midcourse interception faces 
potentially great challenges from countermeasures because all objects, whatever 
their weight, travel at the same speed outside the atmosphere. 
Proposals in 1986 for ERIS deployment were thus rejected by Weinberger, who 
favoured a space-based approach.lxxiv Achieving Reagan’s near-perfect defence 
pushed SDI towards a system designed to intercept Soviet missiles in their boost 
phase, before multiple warheads had been released. Weinberger therefore insisted 
that a defensive deployment must contain a space-based element. At the same time, 
the ground-based hit-to-kill approach was recast with the task of intercepting 
thousands of warheads in mind. Whereas HOE – an experiment to demonstrate 
feasibility - had been very large and expensive, SDI pushed ERIS towards a smaller, 
simpler design. Initially the plan was to make ERIS a ‘dumb’ interceptor with most 
of the target identification and discrimination activities to be carried out by external 
sensors, particularly ones based in space. The kill vehicle would still have an 
infrared telescope to enable it to home onto the target but target identification and 
discrimination from decoys would be the job of the external sensors.lxxv 
Combined with space-based interceptors (SBI), ERIS formed part of the plan for 
early SDI deployment – known as Phase 1 – that Weinberger promoted in early 1987. 
This was intended to placate supporters of early deployment and to entrench 
deployment plans while there was still support – but there was substance too in the 
shift of SDI’s funding towards kinetic energy weapons and away from exotic 
technologies such as lasers.lxxvi  
However, talk of deployment raised widespread concern, including in the armed 
services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been supportive of Reagan’s Star Wars speech 
while it had undermined support for the Freeze movement and deflected criticism 
from the MX basing dilemma, but they were concerned about the sheer scale of 
funding going to SDI. The prospect of SDI deployment raised alarms about what 
effect this would have on the budget for other military programmes. Concerned 
about these budgetary implications, and unimpressed by SDI’s technical claims, 
Chairman of the JCS, Admiral William Crowe sought to bring SDI deployment into 
line with standard procurement procedures.lxxvii 
In July 1987 the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) gave the Phase 1 plan a Milestone 
I recommendation, endorsed by Weinberger that September.lxxviii The plan was for 
phased deployment of a BMD system with Phase 1 comprising two interceptors 
(ERIS and SBI), three sensor systems (two of which were space-based) and a battle 
management/command, control and communications system. Rather than the near-
perfect population defence that Reagan’s Star Wars speech had implied the initial 
mission of the Phase 1 system was ‘to ensure, albeit with less than 100% 
effectiveness, the survival of an effective US retaliatory force capability.’lxxix In fact, 
the planning basis for Phase 1 was for a system that could stop 30% of a Soviet attack 
and even that proved hard to envisage in concrete terms.lxxx  
Attempts to flesh out the cost of the Phase 1 system led to estimates as high as $150 
billion, but reliable cost predictions proved difficult. According to a DAB Milestone 
Panel in the autumn of 1987: ‘As a consequence of the current gaps in systems 
design and technology, none of the current cost estimates can be relied upon’.lxxxi 
Particularly problematic was the space based interceptor element as there were 
many uncertainties regarding the cost of deployment. The number of battle stations 
that would need to be put into orbit depended on a range of factors, including the 
time taken by Soviet missiles in their boost phase (which could be much shorter if a 
new generation of missiles was deployed). It was hoped that an Advanced Launch 
System would reduce the cost of space transportation by more than a factor of ten 
(from about $25,000 per kilogram to less than $1,000 per kilogram), but ALS was still 
in the concept definition stage in 1987 and in fact would never be built.lxxxii 
As it turned out, the difficulties with providing a convincing development plan for 
Phase 1 deployment effectively stopped any deployment while the world was 
transformed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. 
George Bush also replaced Reagan as President at the start of 1989. Bush did not 
share Reagan’s faith in missile defence as a cornerstone of strategic policy; indeed he 
was keen in his first year as President to emphasise the importance of nuclear 
deterrence.lxxxiii However, the Bush administration carried on funding SDI at roughly 
the same levels as before, although it did make one significant change in emphasis. 
The space-based element of the Phase 1 plan had always raised concerns about 
affordability given the sheer amount of equipment that would need to be put into 
orbit, and one solution was to make the space-based interceptors smaller and lighter. 
Such a technology – known as Brilliant Pebbles – had first been proposed in 1986. 
Taken up by Edward Teller and Lowell Wood at Livermore, Brilliant Pebbles 
became their new obsession, taking over from the X-ray laser as that technology fell 
out of favour.lxxxiv 
Brilliant Pebbles received a boost in February 1989 when SDI director Abrahamson’s 
end-of-tour report recommended radical change to Phase 1, based on the ‘improved 
performance and dramatic cost reductions’ that the new technology offered.lxxxv He 
claimed that Brilliant Pebbles could be proven in two years and deployed three years 
later to produce a Phase 1 system that met JCS requirements for not more than about 
$25 billion. 
Convinced by Abrahamson’s strong endorsement, the new Secretary of Defence, 
Richard Cheney, gave SDIO the go-ahead to focus on Brilliant Pebbles in March 
1989.lxxxvi However, with the Soviet Union disintegrating, and huge cuts in Soviet 
warheads under negotiation in START, the rationale supporting deployment 
changed.lxxxvii The Bush administration put forward three rationales to support 
continuing BMD deployment. First, terrorists might gain control of nuclear-armed 
ballistic missiles, particularly given the turmoil that the Soviet state was going 
through. Second, BMD could provide protection against rogue nations that might 
acquire a nuclear capability. Third, there was a risk of accidental launch of ballistic 
missiles, again particularly in the case of Soviet weapons. 
Although the Pentagon and CIA were apparently skeptical about the validity of 
these rationaleslxxxviii, they became the planning basis for a new deployment concept 
known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) announced by the new 
SDIO director, Henry Cooper, in January 1991.lxxxix GPALS was to consist of three 
main elements: a National Missile Defense (NMD) comprising ground-based 
interceptors, a Global Missile Defense (GMD) consisting of space-based interceptors, 
and several Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems, based on land, sea or on mobile 
systems.xc 
Rather than facing thousands of Soviet warheads, GPALS was envisaged as 
protecting against a small attack of up to a hundred missiles, either from an 
accidental launch from the former Soviet Union or a deliberate attack from a small 
nuclear nation or terrorists. As the name implied, GPALS was also intended to 
provide global coverage, extending the defence to US forces abroad and allies. 
Brilliant Pebbles was to provide the space-based component, and according to SDIO 
director Cooper, the technology was sufficiently mature for development to proceed. 
It was also, claimed Cooper, ‘clear that Brilliant Pebbles would be the lowest cost 
and the most militarily effective means of defending both the United States and our 
overseas troops, friends and allies.’xci However, despite SDIO’s conviction that 
Brilliant Pebbles ‘was the most cost-effective GPALS component, by far’, the wider 
politics – particularly within Congress – militated against a deployment decision. A 
particular sticking point was the ABM Treaty that outlawed space-basing of BMD 
technology. However, although Congressional opposition to Brilliant Pebbles would 
remain firm, other missile defence technologies were to receive a major boost from 
an unexpected source: Saddam Hussein, whose Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 
August 1990. 
Phase 3: Back to Earth 
The end of the Cold War, along with growing domestic disillusionment, undercut 
much of the impetus of SDI, but the most significant influence on missile defence in 
the early 1990s was the first Gulf War. The use of Patriot missile to defend US troops 
and Israeli cities in that conflict provided politically compelling (albeit factually 
contested) evidence of how missile defence could alleviate US vulnerability.xcii 
Following the exaggerated claims for the X-ray laser and other futuristic 
technologies it was with the use of Patriot in early 1991 that missile defence began to 
regain political credibility, ironically despite the controversy over Patriot’s actual 
effectiveness.xciii Patriot was an anti-aircraft missile that had been adapted for use 
against short-range ballistic missiles and its technology was relatively old-fashioned. 
However, despite later analysis which indicated a very low intercept rate, the 
immediate impression was that Patriot had proved successful in defending against 
the Iraqi Scud missiles.xciv 
In response Republican missile defence supporters in Congress sought to build a 
consensus around the perceived lessons of the Gulf War, but without recourse to 
politically divisive space-based technologies. They argued that two aspects of the 
Gulf War should be seen as supporting BMD deployment.xcv First, without Patriot, 
US forces, as well as allies, would have had no protection from Saddam’s Scud 
missiles. Second, the fact that Saddam had used these missiles against US forces, and 
also against Israel, showed that deterrence could not be relied on, an especially 
worrying thought if combined with Iraq’s plans to develop nuclear weapons. xcvi 
The impression made by Patriot in Congress was such that a bipartisan Missile 
Defense Act was passed in 1991, but a corollary of building a consensus for 
deployment of ground-based BMD interceptors was that Brilliant Pebbles should be 
taken out of the acquisition programme. Specifically, the Act charged the Secretary 
of Defense with deploying ‘by the earliest date allowed by the availability of 
appropriate technology or by fiscal year 1996 a cost effective, operationally-effective, 
and ABM Treaty-compliant anti-ballistic missile system,’ and Brilliant Pebbles 
deployment was generally considered not to be compliant with the Treaty.xcvii 
Although ‘robust funding’ for Brilliant Pebbles technology demonstration was 
promised by the Missile Defense Act, this never materialized, and work on Brilliant 
Pebbles was completely terminated by the Clinton Administration in 1993.xcviii  
Thereafter, the mainstream of BMD development returned to a more earthbound 
approach. Although the centre of gravity of BMD work only gradually returned to 
Huntsville, the technological emphasis would again be on land- or sea-based 
missiles.xcix In particular, the ground-based interceptor technology initiated in the 
first Bush administration built on the work done at Huntsville in the HOE and ERIS 
programmes.  
The Clinton administration was initially unenthusiastic about strategic BMD, instead 
emphasizing theatre defences.c On 13 May 1993 Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, Les 
Aspin, announced the ‘end of the Star Wars era’, changing the name of the 
organisation in charge of missile defence from SDIO to the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organisation (BMDO). However, disastrous results in the 1994 mid-term elections 
led to a hostile Republican dominated Congress, and strategic missile defence again 
came to the fore as a political issue. The result was another major piece of 
Congressional legislation, the 1995 Ballistic Missile Defense Act. Like its 1991 
predecessor, the 1995 Act sought deployment of a BMD system using ground-based 
interceptors. Unlike the earlier act, the 1995 Act specified a deployment timetable, 
setting 2003 as the date for an initial operational capability. Although vetoed by 
Clinton, the resulting compromise led to a doubling of spending on national missile 
defence.ci 
Further compromise came the following year when the Administration put forward 
what became known as the ‘three-plus-three’ plan whereby a National Missile 
Defense (NMD) system should be demonstrated in (roughly) three years (i.e. by 
2000) with the potential then to deploy if necessary within another three years.cii 
Politically, this plan helped Clinton fend off Republican criticism that he was soft on 
national defence. Technically, however, it set the BMDO a major challenge, as was 
confirmed by a review of missile defence programmes initiated by Lieutenant 
General Lester Lyles who took over as head of BMDO in 1997. This review, headed 
by retired Air Force Chief of Staff Larry Welch, reported in early 1998 with fairly 
damning conclusions over the readiness of missile defence technology. Memorably 
Welch argued that the tight schedule risked a ‘rush to failure’.ciii 
Nevertheless, political pressures continued to build with the publication in 1998 of 
the ‘Rumsfeld Commission’ report on ballistic missile threats from ‘rogue’ states, 
and its apparent validation with the launch of a three-stage missile by North Korea 
on August 31.civ Although the missile did not in itself constitute much of a threat to 
the US mainland, it did indicate North Korean interest in missile development, and 
even more significantly to some, that US intelligence agencies could not be relied on 
to predict potential threats.cv 
However, by the end of 1998 it was clear that the scepticism of the Welch panel was 
justified as no flight tests had yet been carried out. At high-level meetings within the 
administration the Secretary of Defense, Republican William Cohen, won the case 
for significant increases in funding for missile defence. At the same time, the 
deployment timetable was deferred by two years, with 2005 now the target date, 
should a decision to deploy be taken. 
Although the Clinton administration had become increasingly convinced of the 
argument for NMD, poor flight test results (the second and third attempts both 
failed to hit the target) led to a decision not to decide on deployment.cvi That would 
be left to the incoming administration of G. W. Bush. Once elected, the Bush 
administration quickly moved to increase funding for missile defencecvii, and in 
December 2001 made the significant step of announcing US withdrawal from the 
ABM Treaty, to take effect six months later on June 13, 2002. The expectation 
amongst Star Warriors was that the administration of G. W. Bush would switch the 
direction of missile defence away from the land-based approach of the Clinton NMD 
and back towards space-based defence.cviii 
There was some change in emphasis, as many SDI era technologies were revived or 
received a boost in funding (although the space-based laser programme that had 
continued to receive support under the Clinton administration was scaled back).cix In 
addition, the concept of layered defences made a comeback in the plans of the 
Missile Defense Agency (BMDO’s successor).cx However, the only deployment that 
proceeded had ground-based hit-to-kill technology as its centerpiece, with NMD 
renamed the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD). On December 17, 2002 
President Bush announced that the US would begin deployment with the aim of 
achieving initial operational status in 2004.cxi The plan was to have interceptor 
missiles based in Alaska and California with the intention of providing protection 
against ICBMs launched from Northeast Asia and the Middle East.  
Although the flight tests had mixed results, deployment pressed ahead.cxii Other 
elements of the Bush missile defence plan included ship-based interceptor missiles 
(the Aegis system) and the continued development of an airplane-based laser. 
However, space-based systems were not included in the plan, and if anything the 
climate for such technology appeared to become more unfavourable as studies by 
the American Physical Society and the Congressional Budget Office cast doubt on 
the practicality of boost phase defences.cxiii For example, the APS study concluded 
that ‘a thousand or more interceptors would be needed for a system having the 
lowest possible mass and providing a realistic decision time. Even so, the total mass 
that would have to be orbited would require at least a five- to tenfold increase over 
current US space-launch rates, making such a system impractical.’cxiv 
Return of the Star Warriors? 
The ‘success’ of Patriot in the Gulf conflicts, the Congressional compromise to 
support deployment of ground-based interceptors, and the decision of the G. W. 
Bush administration to push ahead with GMD deployment all seemed to mark the 
end of the Star Wars adventure. However, despite this apparent triumph for 
ground-based missile defence advocates, there remains a coterie of ‘Star Warriors’ 
insistent on the superiority of a space-based approach. Key figures include Lowell 
Wood of Lawrence Livermore, Greg Canavan of Los Alamos, and William Van 
Cleave of Missouri State University, as well as former SDI director, Henry Cooper.  
These Star Warriors continue to lobby for the deployment of space-based defences, 
while at the same time opposing any further deployment of ground based 
interceptors. An extended rationale and mission statement for the space-based BMD 
approach is set out in a ‘2007 Report’ on ‘Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, & 
the Twenty-First Century’.cxv What is distinctive about the Star Warriors approach is 
their dismissal of ground-based interceptors, which they consider to be a 
technologically inferior approach that is only useful, if at all, as part of a layered 
defence in which space-based systems play the main role. Thus the report argues 
that ‘GMD is a limited midcourse defense that will be effective against only a few 
missiles with simple decoys. Because GMD cannot adequately discriminate among 
midcourse threats, it may be prone to failure unless it becomes part of a layered 
missile defense.’cxvi 
The Star Warriors argue that although ‘ground-based missile defense (GMD) is 
presumed to be the most feasible because it has been under continuous development 
for over thirty-five years and receives far more money and attention than other 
options, it is also the most limited, especially when compared to the space-based 
systems discussed in this report.’cxvii In particular, the Star Warriors lament the fact 
that the Bush administration ‘chose to follow the Clinton administration in focusing 
its effort on relatively costly and largely ineffective ground-based systems rather 
than exploiting the most potentially effective technologies.’cxviii 
Moreover, the Star Warriors see the failure to deploy their preferred space-based 
technology as the result of a ‘small but vocal minority’ producing a situation where 
‘political considerations have by and large dictated technical behavior, with the goal 
of developing the most technologically-sound and cost-effective defenses 
subordinated to other interests.’ cxix Much of the case put by the Star Warriors relies 
on the familiar argument that boost-phase interception is key, because the target is 
conspicuous, vulnerable, and has not yet released its warheads and decoys. 
However, alongside this theoretical argument there is some empirically-grounded 
evidence used to support the case for the feasibility of space-based defences. This 
does not derive from testing of Brilliant Pebbles technology per se. Some tests were 
carried out between 1990 and 1992, but these were largely unsuccessful.cxx Instead, 
the main empirical experience drawn on is a space probe programme known as 
Clementine. Clementine was devised in the dying days of Brilliant Pebbles, when its 
supporters within SDI, aware that funding for Brilliant Pebbles was about to be cut, 
sought a way to carry out a demonstration of some of its key technologies. Jointly 
supported by the BMDO and NASA, the Clementine probe was launched on 25 
January 1994, and successfully orbited and imaged the moon. The second part of 
Clementine’s mission, to carry out a fly-by of an asteroid and then continue into 
deep space, was not a success, however, due to a computer malfunction.cxxi 
Nevertheless, Clementine has been accorded mythical status amongst Star Warriors 
because of its role as a test-bed for Brilliant Pebbles technology. In May 2001 Cooper 
claimed that ‘the Clementine deep-space probe successfully space-qualified nearly 
the entire suite of first-generation Brilliant Pebbles hardware (scavenged from the 
then-defunct Pebbles program, scuttled by the Clinton administration) and 
software.’ According to Cooper: ‘The undeniable scientific fact is that the Pebbles 
technology was mature in 1991 -- as the Clementine mission to the moon so clearly 
demonstrated in 1994.’cxxii 
Nevertheless, despite these arguments, ground-based interceptors are currently the 
system of choice for US national missile defence. The Star Warriors continue to press 
their case, arguing not just that space-based defences are better, but also that the 
ground-based interceptors are ineffective. In doing so, of course, they also thus 
undermine support for the current GMD system. Despite the (temporary?) closure 
around the choice of ground-based interceptors, the technological divide remains as 
large as ever. 
Discussion: Technical Controversy and the Politics of Missile Defence 
For most of its history, now over half a century, ballistic missile defence technology 
has been deeply controversial. Critics have questioned whether it is technically 
feasible, whether it is strategically wise, and whether it is economically 
justifiable.cxxiii The issue of technical feasibility, in particular, has come to be central 
to the arguments of BMD opponents. However, it is clear that the technical disputes 
run deeper than this because supporters of missile defence also strongly contest 
claims made about the performance of certain missile defence technologies, with two 
main opposing camps divided by their preferences for ground or space based 
systems. 
Such disputes are hard to resolve on purely technical grounds because empirical 
evidence of technological performance is less than compelling. Actual use of missile 
defence has been very rare; the only examples being the short-range Patriot against 
Iraqi Scud missiles in the two Gulf conflicts. Tellingly, even that operational 
experience produced evidence that was far from clear-cut. Initial claims of high 
Patriot success rates in the first war were contested, and it is now generally accepted 
that in that conflict the Patriot was responsible for shooting down few, if any, 
Scuds.cxxiv In the case of defence against nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, there is not 
only no experience of such use, but also no experience of nuclear war at all. 
Most empirical evidence instead comes from testing, but here again there are limits 
to what can be achieved. Evidence gained from testing can always be questioned on 
the grounds that the tests are insufficiently similar to operational use.cxxv Such 
arguments have been well articulated by critics of BMD. Amongst the issues raised 
in relation to GMD testing are that most tests have been on the same intercept 
trajectories, with the sun in the same position, and that the time and direction of 
attack, as well as the nature of the incoming warheads and any decoys, have all been 
known in advance.cxxvi 
Disputes over BMD technology thus rely heavily on theoretical arguments. 
Although the origins of Reagan’s Star War speech and the resulting SDI had much to 
do with domestic politics, the pivotal conceptual element was the argument for 
using boost-phase interception to overcome the challenge of multiple warheads and 
decoys. This is compelling in principle because the difficulties of midcourse 
discrimination are considerable, and this is generally considered a significant 
potential weakness of the GMD system that is currently deployed.cxxvii However, 
advocates of midcourse defence maintain discrimination would be possible with a 
well-designed system against likely decoys.cxxviii 
The practicality of space-based systems, on the other hand, hinges on the cost of 
putting them into orbit, but cost estimates depend on the weight of the interceptors 
and number required, and this calculation in turn is based on assumptions about the 
duration of enemy missiles’ boost phase and the speed of the interceptors. This 
calculus is further complicated by the potential countermeasures that could be used 
by enemies seeking to overcome a boost phase defence. Thus, the claim that boost 
phase interception eliminates the problem of midcourse discrimination can be 
countered by the argument that opponents could deploy missiles with such short 
boost phases as to make interception practically impossible. Even with a boost phase 
lasting four minutes (typical for liquid-fueled ICBMs compared to three minutes for 
solid-fueled ones), the time left for interception is very short once detection, tracking 
and decision-making are taken into account.cxxix In addition, the APS study noted 
other countermeasures that could defeat boost-phase defences -- whether 
terrestrially or space based – ‘such as maneuvering and deployment of thrusted 
decoys during upper stage boost, and even multiple upper stages (all of which were 
employed in one form or another as early as 40 years ago.)’cxxx 
The scenarios for missile defence use are thus highly speculative and dependent on a 
wide range of assumptions. Theoretical discourse, not empirical experience, is the 
main means for determining the technology that is developed and deployed. Test 
performance obviously matters, but concept credibility is also important. In this 
regard the Star Warriors have a problem if their credibility has been undermined by 
the association that some of them have with the ill-fated X-ray laser. Because the X-
ray laser was over-sold so aggressively and under-delivered so spectacularly, its 
supporters may not now been seen as reliable in regard to their claims for what 
technology can be developed.cxxxi  
The battle lines between the Star Warriors and the Huntsville mafia remain as 
divided as ever. As far as deployment is concerned, the supporters of ground-based 
systems are now in the ascendancy, although the current deployment is limited and 
some advocates of GMD are unhappy with the way the programme has been 
managed, and particularly with the limited nature of flight testing and the lack of 
improvement through ‘spiral development’.cxxxii However, supporters of space-
based systems remain convinced of the superiority of their approach, and it seems 
unlikely that any conclusive test could be devised to settle this dispute. If both types 
of system were to be deployed (very unlikely), and if there were to be a substantial 
ballistic missile attack on the US (extremely unlikely), then it might be possible to 
gauge the relative effectiveness of the two technologies (although given the chaos of 
the ‘fog of war’ this is also questionable). Otherwise, and almost certainly, the 
argument will remain largely theoretical and unresolved. Success for BMD 
technology will thus remain dependent on theoretical plausibility, credibility and 
the shifting currents of US domestic politics. 
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